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ABSTRACT  
The aim of this study is to explore the role that accounting systems effectively played in managing the internal relationships 
among the various administrative bodies of the Comune (City State) of Siena in the 14th century. This period was 
characterized by an ever increasing need to monitor economic activities, a need perceived by the Comune with regard to all 
those who were entrusted with the management of public funds. In particular, in 1358 an office was created specifically to 
review the accounts of the camarlenghi (who were in charge of the management of public funds) nominated by the Comune 
of Siena. The office was originally staffed by three temporary Riveditori (auditors) and later by a permanent commission of 
Regolatori (regulators). On the basis of archival sources, so abundant on 14th century Siena, this paper analyses the changing 
relationships among the various administrative bodies of the Comune, in particular detail the Gabella generale and the 
Biccherna (which were the offices in charge of managing the main cash inflows and outflows pertaining to the administration 
of the Comune) and the activities of the Regolatori. By interpreting accounting systems as a set of rules (i.e., the formalised 
statements of procedures), roles (the network of social positions), and routines (the practices habitually in use), the present 
study shows that, since the Middle Ages, accounting has played a central role in the management of internal 
interdependencies and in the construction of organisational order. In the case of the Comune in the 14th century, accounting 
practices were capable of regulating, legitimising and balancing relations of power, dependency and autonomy among the 
different bodies of the same organisation. 
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The role that accounting systems play in coordinating and integrating the various categories of 
interests, values and convictions that come together in an organisation is a particularly interesting 
theme for researchers and business managers. In recent years, both in the world of business and in 
the public sector, increasing attention has been paid to the role of accounting in regulating the 
relationships between the various divisions, units and functions which comprise the parts of 
organisations of all genres. In this context, accounting has been described as being able to coordinate 
internal activities and interactions, to legitimise the exercise of power of some groups over others and 
to provide the moral underpinnings for relationships of dependency and autonomy (Hopwood 1990; 
Macintosh and Scapens 1990; Dent 1991; Hopwood and Miller 1994; Burns and Scapens 2000; Catturi 
and Riccaboni 2001; Busco et al. 2006).  
Along these lines, accounting systems have been portrayed as capable of providing organisations with 
a common language, translating everyday operations into financial measurements (Roberts and 
Scapens 1985; Macintosh and Scapens 1990; Catturi and Riccaboni 1996; Busco et al. 2006). Such 
measures allow organisations to communicate through time and space, by recording past events and 
documenting the overall history of the firm and of its members (Ferraris Franceschi 1998; Catturi 
2003; Mussari and Mussari 2006). From this point of view, accounting systems provide not only 
quantitative information, but they also have the potential for documenting the economic, social, and 
institutional context in which they have been implemented. 
Importantly, numerous studies have attempted to understand accounting beyond its technical aspects, 
by exploring the constitutive power of accounting in relation to organisations and society and as being 
implicated in a wide range of organisational activities and social arrangements (see, among the others, 
Hopwood and Miller 1994; Abernethy and Vagnoni 2004; Busco et al. 2006; Ahrens and Chapman 
2007). As suggested by Hopwood, “the relationship of accounting to organizational power structures, 
and the attendant pressures to maintain the organizational status quo in terms of the preservation of 
existing organizational relationships, languages of discourse and ways of defining the scope of the 
problematic, also need further inquiry in this respect” (Hopwood 1977, 277). 
A relevant contribution to understanding how accounting is and has been able to influence the 
construction of organisational order is also provided by studies of accounting history (Carnegie and 
Napier 1996; Napier 2006), which have investigated the relations between accounting and various 
social arrangements over time (for some examples, see Quattrone 2004; Riccaboni et al. 2006; Mussari 
and Magliacani 2007). In this context, studying the historical layers of accounting systems is deemed 
necessary for understanding the complex relationships between accounting and organisational 
priorities (Hopwood 1987). 
This paper aims to explore whether and how accounting systems were capable to shape and manage 
the internal interdependencies among the various organisational participants in the past. To achieve 
this objective, the paper examines the case of the Comune of Siena (one of the most important Italian 
Medieval City States) in the 14th century. This period was characterized by an ever increasing need to 
monitor economic activity, a need perceived by the Comune with regards to all those who were 
entrusted with the management of public funds. In particular, in 1358 an office was created 
specifically to review the accounts of the camarlenghi (treasurers in charge of record keeping and of 
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the management of public funds) nominated by the Comune of Siena. The office was originally staffed 
by three temporary Riveditori (auditors) and later by a permanent commission of Regolatori 
(regulators). Focusing in particular detail on the Biccherna and the Gabella (which were the two major 
offices in charge of the management of public funds), this paper explores the role that accounting 
took on in regulating, coordinating and integrating the relationships between different bodies of the 
Comune of Siena in the 14th century.  
The study was developed through the analysis of documents, statutes and accounting books (the 
books of accounts reviewed by the Regolatori) from the 14th century in the Archivio di Stato (State 
Archives) in Siena. This source of material has been integrated and complemented by the analysis of 
more recent published studies on the activities of the Regolatori (Catoni 1975) and on the historical 
background of the Comune in the 14th century (Bowsky 1970; Bowsky 1981; Moscadelli 1982; Waley 
1991; Giorgi and Moscadelli 2005). The use of the different sources is clearly indicated throughout 
the paper. By relying upon this material, the relationships between the various bodies of the Comune 
of Siena as well as the evolution of accounting practices are described and analysed. 
The rest of the paper has the following structure. Section two discusses the potential role of 
accounting in managing the internal interdependencies within the organisation (i.e. the relations 
among the various organisational members), through a review of some key contributions in recent 
accounting literature. Sections three and four illustrate the case of the Comune of Siena, by giving 
some key insights regarding the relationships between different administrative bodies of the Comune 
and the accounting records of the Gabella and the Biccherna. Section five builds on the theoretical 
insights outlined in section two to discuss the role played by accounting systems in managing the 
relations between the General Council of the Comune, the Biccherna, the Gabella and the 
Riveditori/Regolatori in the 14th century. Finally, section six concludes the paper by summarising the 
key features of the analysis and outlining opportunities for future research. 
 
2. The role of accounting in managing internal interdependencies 
During the 1990s a number of scholars described accounting practices as organisational routines (see, 
among others, Roberts and Scapens 1985; Roberts and Scapens 1990; Dent 1991; Scapens 1994; 
Mouritsen 1994; Burns and Scapens 2000; Merchant and Riccaboni 1992; Euske and Riccaboni 1999; 
Catturi and Riccaboni 1996). These contributions were directly or indirectly influenced by the work 
of Nelson and Winter (1982, 410), who suggested that “one area of firm behaviour that plainly is 
governed by a highly structured set of routines is accounting”. The reflective and constitutive role of 
accounting systems has long been debated in the literature (see, for instance Hopwood 1987; 
Hopwood 1990; Macintosh and Scapens 1990). Portrayed as playing a “powerful role in 
organisational and social affairs”, accounting practices have been said to “influence perceptions, 
change language and infuse dialogue, thereby permeating the way in which priorities, concerns and 
worries, and new possibilities for action are expressed” (Hopwood 1990, 9).  
The adoption of Old Institutional Economics in accounting research has led to the conceptualisation 
of accounting practices as a set of rules and routines that both shape and are shaped by the firm’s 
institutions, i.e. taken-for-granted assumptions (Burns and Scapens 2000; Scapens 1994). According 
to this perspective, accounting systems comprise procedures and practices that are likely to be 
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institutionalised, when they become widely accepted within the organisation and represent an 
unquestioned and unquestionable form of management control. Institutionalised accounting 
practices are capable of shaping organisational activities and interactions, stimulating expected 
patterns of behaviour, and defining the relations among the firm’s groups and/or individuals (Burns 
2000). 
Similarly, Roberts and Scapens (1985) discuss the concept of accounting as a “language” that provides 
organisations with a set of categories to make sense of activities, to anticipate the future, and to assess 
and plan actions. They also affirm that accounting practices involve much more than the production 
and reproduction of meanings. These practices also embody a moral order by institutionalising 
reciprocal rights and obligations. In this way accounting practices can communicate a set of values 
and ideals of expected behaviour and of what is approved or disapproved of, supporting the 
coordination and integration of different practices. “By providing a common language and a 
definition of mutual rights and obligations, accounting allows for organisation. Accounting serves as 
a means of directing and realising the productive potential of organisation” (Roberts and Scapens 
1985, 449). 
In this research agenda, Macintosh and Scapens (1990) rely on Giddens’ structuration theory (1984) 
to interpret “the ways in which accounting is involved in the institutionalization of social relations” 
(Macintosh and Scapens 1990, 474). In so doing, they argue that accounting systems can be 
interpreted as modalities of structuration in the three dimensions of signification, legitimation and 
domination identified by Giddens. Importantly Macintosh and Scapens (1990) define accounting 
practices as a set of: 
1) interpretive schemes (signification), used by the management to interpret past results, take actions 
and make plans, 
2) norms (legitimation), setting values and ideals about what is approved and disapproved of, and 
3) facilities (domination), used by managers at all levels to coordinate and control participants.  
By providing the organisation with interpretive schemes, norms and facilities, the institutionalised 
language of accounting becomes part of the framework of meaning used to make sense of activities 
(Macintosh and Scapens 1990). Such language sets values and ideals about what ought to count, what 
ought to happen, and what is thought to be important, while providing the moral underpinnings for 
power structures and relationships of dependence and autonomy within the organisation. By 
institutionalising the reciprocal obligations and rights of managers throughout the organisation, 
accounting practices legitimise social actions and interactions. In so doing, these practices are capable 
of facilitating the exercise of power by some groups over others, by giving particular meaning to 
organisational activities: “Command over the management accounting process, for example, is a 
resource which can be used in the exercise of power in organisations. Drawing on the domination 
structure certain organisational participants hold others accountable for particular activities” 
(Macintosh and Scapens 1990, 457).  
From this point of view, accounting systems can be viewed as carriers of the information that allow 
for the coordination and integration of diverse organisational practices (see Macintosh and Scapens 
1990; Roberts and Scapens 1985). According to Burns and Scapens (2000), rules and routines are 
necessary devices in coordinating the actions of a group, as they define how things should be done. 
When shared organisationally, the power of routines is reinforced by their ability to reduce conflict. 
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From this point of view, the institutionalisation of rules and norms is a key coordination mechanism. 
By extending the interpretation of Burns and Scapens (2000), Busco et al. (2006) portray MAS 
(management accounting system) as a set of rules (i.e., the formalised statements of procedures), roles 
(the network of social positions), and routines (the practices habitually in use) which, along with other 
organisational systems, are involved in the production and reproduction of organisational contexts. 
They emphasize the importance of roles, as access points to the accounting systems and as key players 
within the processes of interpersonal interaction within the organisation. 
The disciplinary and informative role of accounting has also been emphasised in recent research on 
governance (see Seal 2006; Roberts 2001). Since corporate governance also concerns the creation and 
distribution of surplus, management accounting practices such as budgeting, standard costing and 
performance measurement can offer key information on the strategic direction of the firm, and it can 
also hold senior management accountable. According to Seal (2006, 402), “if management accounting 
is to play a role in improving corporate governance, then the establishment and reproduction of 
appropriate institutionalized practices and routines is crucial”. 
As argued by Euske and Riccaboni, accounting systems have the potential of playing a key role in 
managing internal and external interdependencies. In particular, they claim that: “Internal 
interdependencies can be categorized as relating to controlling the relationship of management and 
workers, the separation of ownership and control, and the division of labour among different levels 
of management” (1999, 463). 
More recently, Ahrens and Chapman (2007) have emphasised how accounting practices are central to 
organising, as they help to bring about connections between the diverse activities of organisational 
members. 
The theoretical contributions reviewed in this section highlight how accounting systems can play an 
active role in shaping organisational activities and interactions. Accounting can be viewed as a means 
for controlling workers at a distance by providing the controller with the necessary information 
(Miller and O’ Leary 1994). It can be also used to legitimate employees’ activities by demonstrating 
that they have fulfilled their obligations, thereby playing a relevant role in regulating the actions and 
the interactions among the various organisational members. By providing managers and employees 
with a common language to interpret organisational phenomena in the same way, accounting supports 
coordination and social interactions. Such perspective is capable of giving prominence to roles (the 
network of social positions that act as access points to accounting practices) as a key part of the 
accounting system (Busco et al. 2006). 
Building on the theoretical insights outlined in this section, the case of the Comune of Siena in the 
14th century will be introduced and analysed in the following sections. While exploring the patterns 
of interactions among the different bodies of the Comune, focusing in particular detail on the role of 
the Regolatori, it emerges that new accounting rules and practices were introduced, following the 
increasing need of the Comune to control the management of public funds. The changing relations 
among the various bodies of the Comune, along with the evolution of accounting and control 
practices, raise some relevant questions about the possible role that accounting systems played in 
regulating and managing the relations between the General Council of the Comune, the Regolatori, 
the Biccherna and the Gabella in the 14th century. 
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3. The case of the Comune of Siena in the 14th century: the relationships 
between the Biccherna, the Gabella and the Regolatori 
In the first half of the 14th century, the City of Siena was characterized by one of the most important 
governments ever in its history: the so called Government of the Nine (1287-1355), also called 
Signoria, whose members were selected from the upper-middle class mercantile community and 
served a two-month term. The political and bureaucratic structure of the City State was constituted 
by several other bodies, including the General Council (Consiglio generale or Generale Consilium 
Campane), and a number of collegial magistracies, such as the Biccherna, the Gabella, and the 
Mercanzia (Bowsky 1970; Bowsky 1981; Waley 1991). The General Council was an assembly of about 
300 citizens and was the chief political and legislative body of the Comune (Waley 1991). Frequently, 
key decisions concerning the Comune were delegated by the General Council to the Concistoro, a 
collegial body comprised by the Nine and members of the main magistracies (e.g. Biccherna and 
Mercanzia) of the city. The Government of the Nine exerted considerable pressure on some important 
initiatives, such as the project for the city walls, the network of underground aqueducts (bottini) and 
the city hall (palazzo pubblico). They also took an active part in promoting the ambitious project of 
the new cathedral (duomo nuovo), begun in the first half of the 1300s and destined to remain 
incomplete after mid-century (Giorgi and Moscadelli 2005).  
During the Government of the Nine (1287-1355), the Biccherna was the central administrative body 
of the city, in charge of all payments to officials and citizens working for the Comune. All main 
incoming funds from the collection of taxes passed through the Biccherna, either directly or by way 
of other offices. Importantly, by the end of the 13th century, a new office called Gabella generale 
substituted the Biccherna in the collection of nearly all indirect taxation. However, at that time the 
Gabella had to turn over all its incoming funds to the Biccherna (Moscadelli 1982). 
At the beginning of the 14th century, a commission of five members (auditors) was appointed to 
periodically review the ragioni (accounts) of the Biccherna and, beginning in 1307, also the accounts 
of the Gabella and the other offices of the Comune. This commission was nominated by the consuls 
of the Mercanzia and by the Nine and it had to include at least two of the consuls of Mercanzia. By 
monitoring the accounts of the various offices of the Comune (including those of the Biccherna and 
the Gabella), the five auditors were essentially responsible for verifying the collection of taxes and 
payments in the best financial interest of the Comune. In situations where this did not in fact prove to 
be the case, the auditors’ duty was to cancel the records from the books and charge the proper source 
for the illicit payment. Approved accounting records were transcribed into the master ledger of the 
Comune and discussed in front of the General Council. It was on this occasion that the auditors were 
called upon to illustrate the reasons for approvals and to elaborate on observations. Through the work 
of the five auditors, the General Council could control the activities of both the Biccherna and the 
Gabella (Catoni 1975; Moscadelli 1982). 
During the first decades of the 14th century, relations between the Gabella and the Biccherna evolved. 
The Gabella gained a higher level of autonomy. Its incoming funds were not turned over to the 
Biccherna in their entirety, but began to be utilized in part for specific projects (for instance to 
complete the city walls or to pay back loans). During the 1330s, the Gabella started to autonomously 
manage its own financial resources, passing on only the residual to the Biccherna. As a result of these 
changes in the balance of power, tensions arose. Since the Gabella was in charge of the collection of 
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taxes, the Biccherna could be found in the situation of having fewer available financial resources in 
spite of the Gabella’s plentiful funding. It was therefore necessary to re-balance power relationships 
between the body that was in charge of the management of public spending (the Biccherna) and the 
one in which most of the Comune’s incoming funds were concentrated (the Gabella) (Bowsky 1970; 
Bowsky 1981; Moscadelli 1982).  
This need was embodied within a series of reforms starting in 1338, which modified the accounting 
and auditing system regulating the relationship between the Biccherna and the Gabella. Beginning in 
1339, the Gabella could no longer make payments nor loans. On at least a weekly basis, the Gabella 
was required to deposit all incoming funds to the Biccherna, together with a statement recording all 
financial inflows. The 1338 reforms not only altered the Gabella’s responsibilities, but they also 
attributed more supervisory and decision-making power to the Biccherna. Furthermore, the Biccherna 
was now drawing weekly financial resources from the Gabella and was in charge of reviewing the 
Gabella’s monthly financial statements, particularly with regards to the Gabella’s debts and credits. 
In this way, the Biccherna took over the management of the key financial movements in public 
spending (Moscadelli 1982).  
In 1355 during the first visit of the emperor Charles IV to Siena, the Government of the Nine was 
substituted by the so-called Government of the Twelve, a popular government supported by the 
aristocratic families of the town. Following the high financial expenditure related to the numerous 
initiatives carried out during the Government of the Nine, as well as increasing military expenses and 
loss in the purchasing power of money after the black death, the new government was in a position of 
having to exert greater control over public expenditure. In particular, they started to exert greater 
control over officers’ salaries, frauds, public initiatives, and the financial treasury of the Comune. 
Also, whereas they did not want to increase direct taxation, indirect taxes grew. In 1358 a new 
magistracy made up of three Riveditori de le ragioni (reviewers of accounts) was instituted to reinforce 
the control of the accounts of all camarlenghi (treasurers in charge of the bookkeeping, as well as of 
payments and receipts) of the Comune. Moreover, the tasks assigned to the Gabella and the Biccherna 
were more clearly delineated and regulated, and were soon embedded into a new auditing system 
(Catoni 1975; Moscadelli 1982).  
The Biccherna lost its original political and administrative power and it was deprived of its supervisory 
role over the accounts and activities of the Gabella. Whereas the three Riveditori were initially 
dependent from the Biccherna, later they were granted complete autonomy. The Gabella had to 
transfer to the Biccherna all funds that were not used for specific projects, and both the Biccherna and 
the Gabella had to keep accurate accounts of their activities, which were subject to regular audits.1 
The establishment of a permanent office (that of the Riveditori) specifically intended for the auditing 
of accounts represented an important change in the way in which public accounts were overseen. The 
new practices came to be standardized and crucial procedures in the administrative life of the 
Comune. These practices were intended not only to ensure the Comune against fraudulence, but also 
to control public spending and to regulate relationships between the different bodies of the Comune.  
On the heels of the increasing need to oversee accounts, in 1361 it was established that all camarlenghi 
had to present their accounting books to the three Riveditori within fifteen days prior to the end of 
                                                 
1 Archivio di Stato di Siena (=ASSi), Regolatori 2. 
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their term in office (and not within a month or a month and a half as was previously the case). Aiming 
to augment the Riveditori’s role in reviewing the accounts, beginning in 1363 the office of the three 
Riveditori was assisted and later substituted by four Regolatori (regulators). Differently from the 
Riveditori, the Regolatori had well defined structure, functioning and tasks. In addition to controlling 
the accounts, the Regolatori were later on entrusted with the control over rules and norms. The four 
Regolatori were elected annually by the General Council and at the end of their mandate they could 
not be elected again for other five years.  
The reviewed accounts had to be first certified by the Regolatori and then presented to the General 
Council for final approval. Between 1362 and 1377, more than three-hundred accounting books were 
reviewed by the Regolatori, who began to keep the result of their work in a specific archive (Catoni 
1975). After July 1363, the Biccherna – whose position was most definitely subordinate to that of the 
Regulatori – could not carry out any type of payment without the expressed permission of the 
Regolatori. By carrying out this procedure, the Regolatori wielded not only the power to judge the 
legitimacy of public spending, but also that of influencing the Comune’s economic policy. 
 
4. The accounting books of the Biccherna and the Gabella 
The first documented audit of the accounts of the Biccherna was performed by the Riveditori and was 
approved by the General Council on 15th December 1363.2 The audit was carried out on the inflows 
and outflows of financial resources concerning the Biccherna’s activities during the first six months of 
1362. By analyzing the accounting books of Biccherna reviewed by the auditors, it is possible to 
observe that the main financial inflows of the Biccherna were funds that the officials of the Gabella 
had collected and then transferred to the Biccherna. The main financial outflows were related to 
expenditures for the army. An example of the accounts of the Biccherna is provided in Table 1. 
 
[Entrate - Inflows]  lire soldi denari3 
(…)     
E troviamo che a ricevuto da Agustino di Guido Insengne, 
Francescho di Bindo Forteguerra e compangni, camarlengo e 












  9 
(…)     
                                                 
2 The Regolatori substituted the Riveditori in 1363 and, therefore, the first documented audit of the Biccherna’s and Gabella’s 
accounts (which was approved by the General Council in 1363) is documented in the book of the Regolatori. However, the 
audit was actually carried out by the Riveditori in 1362 (ASSi, Regolatori 2). 
3 1 lira is equal to 20 soldi; and 1 soldo is equal to 12 denari; in the manuscript, figures are expressed in Roman numeral. 
4 From Agustino di Guido Insengne, Francescho di Bindo Forteguerra and their colleagues, camarlengo and officers 
(esecutori) of the Gabella; in this way we received a receipt from the above mentioned Agustino. 
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  9 
     
[Uscite - Outflows]     
In prima troviamo che a pagati a tutti gl’officiali [del Comune] 
come per lo suo libro partitamente appare6 
  





(…)     
E troviamo che a pagato a tutti e soldati da cavallo e da piei come 
appare partitamente per lo suo libro ne’ detti suoi mesi7 
  
  64959 
 
  3 
 
  3 
(…)     
Somma per tutto l’escita de’ detti sei mesi come di sopra 




  3 
 
  9 
Resta più l’escita che l’entrata9           7   5   0 
Table 1. The accounts of the Biccherna reviewed by the Riveditori (1 January - 30 June 1362) and approved by the General 
Council of the Commune (a translation of the table is provided in the footnotes). Source: ASSi, Regolatori 2, ff. 26v-29v. 
The main financial inflow pertaining to the Gabella (which were documented in the book of the 
audited accounts of the first semester of 1362) was the gabella (indirect taxation) on wine. The main 
financial outflows were funds that were transferred to the Biccherna. Importantly, a small part of the 
incoming funds of the Gabella were allotted to specific projects and were not transferred to the 
Biccherna. An example of the account of the Gabella is provided in Table 2. 
[Entrate - Inflows]  lire soldi denari 
(…)     
Ancho da le cabelle vendute per lo Comuno10    44435 14     7 
Ancho da la cabella del vino della città e del contado11    47092 13     7 
(…)     
                                                 
5 Amount of the financial inflows of the period of six months as it is mentioned above. 
6 To all the officers of the Comune, as it is shown in its accounting book. 
7 To all the knights and foot soldiers, as it is shown in their accounting book in the months indicated. 
8 Total amount of payments of the period of six months as it is mentioned above. 
9 The payments are more than the receipts. 
10 Gabelle (indirect taxation) sold by the Comune. 
11 Gabelle for the wine of the city and of the surrounding countryside. 
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Somma per tutto la detta entrata de’ nostri sei mesi12   125240 12   10 
     
[Uscite - Outflows]     
Im prima troviamo che a dati a Petro Venture e a Biagio del 
maestro Chello e conpagni camarlengo e quatro di Biccherna fra 






  6 
 
 
  9 
(…)     
Ancho troviamo che ristituì a misser Benedetto veschovo di 
Grosseto li. centosesantacinque per vigore d’uno stantiamento 
fatto in Conseglio generale14 
  
 
      165 
 
 
  0 
 
 
  0 
Ancho troviamo che ristituì ad Anbruogio di Ceccho Bernardini 
detto l’Abbate li. centovintinove, s. diciotto, d. sei, e quali spese a 
Talamone per lo Comune di Siena per vigore d’uno stantiamento 













(…)      
Somma per tutto l’escita di detti sei mesi16  125240 12 10 
Table 2. The accounts of Gabella reviewed by the Riveditori (1 January - 30 June 1362) and approved by the General Council 
of the Comune (22 December 1363). Source: ASSi, Regolatori 2, ff. 37v-38v.  
By reviewing the Biccherna’s and the Gabella’s accounting books, the Riveditori (and later the 
Regolatori) could check for frauds and damages to the Comune, monitor the way in which the 
Comune’s financial resources were being used by the Biccherna and the Gabella, control and regulate 
the relations between the Gabella and the Biccherna and, in particular, the funds transferred from the 
Gabella to the Biccherna. 
 
                                                 
12 Total amount of receipts during our six months. 
13 To Petro Venture and to Biagio del maestro Chello and their colleagues, camarlengo and the four officers of the Biccherna, 
more than once, as it is showed. 
14 To Benedetto, bishop of Grosseto, according to a decision taken during the General Council. 
15 To Ambruogio di Ceccho Berardini, called “Abbate” (Abbot), for the money he paid in Talamone for the Comune of 
Siena, according to the decision of the Concistoro (Consistory) for the Ufficiali del mare (Sea Officers). 
16 Total amount of payments in the above mentioned six months. 
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5. Discussion: the role played by accounting in managing internal 
interdependencies 
The case of the Comune of Siena in the 14th century demonstrates how auditing and accounting 
practices assumed a central role in managing the relationships between the various bodies of the 
administrative apparatus of the Comune. This role was not merely related to the technical properties 
of auditing practices. Rather, it was enabled by the social construction of these practices. 
In the Comune the auditing system had enough flexibility to leave space to evolving power 
relationships (“the interpretative flexibility of technique”, Power 1995), while gradually embodying 
them into new ‘official’ practices (the “stabilizing of practices”, Power 1995). In this context, order 
was not merely created through pre-set auditing techniques. Rather, evolving auditing practices 
resulted from a growing search for social order and control in the medieval City State, thereby shaping 
power relationships between different financial offices. 
At the beginning of the 14th century, as the Gabella was acquiring a higher level of autonomy, the 
power exerted by the Biccherna created the conditions for new auditing and control practices to be 
established with the specific purpose of reinforcing the power of the Biccherna. The Gabella was 
required to keep more accurate accounts of incoming funds and to report these accounts to the 
Biccherna, which had access to the Gabella’s monthly accounting books and was in charge of reviewing 
the debts and credits that the Gabella accrued. The new auditing practices stimulated new social 
processes by shaping the relations between the Gabella and the Biccherna, which was now drawing 
weekly financial resources from the Gabella. Through the auditing of accounting records, the 
Biccherna could control the activities of the Gabella over the collection of taxes and specific payments 
(figure 1. - arrow “c”). On the other hand, through the accounting system the Gabella could 
demonstrate and legitimise the use of specific amounts of financial resources for specific projects 
(figure 1. - arrow “d”), transferring only the remaining funds to the Biccherna.  
Moreover, both the Biccherna and the Gabella had to report their accounts to the five auditors 
nominated by the consul of the Mercanzia and by the Nine. The five auditors had access to accounting 
information concerning the Biccherna’s and the Gabella’s activities, allowing the General Council of 
the Comune to control the two offices at a distance (figure 1. - arrows “a”). At the same time, through 
the accounting system, both the Biccherna and the Gabella could legitimise their activities and their 
interactions (figure 1. - arrows “b”). 
In 1355, with the changeover from the Government of the Nine to the Government of the Twelve, 
the need for more systematic control over financial inflows and outflows emerged and was embodied 
within a new auditing system. Importantly, the auditing and control process was centralised by 
specific offices (the Riveditori followed by the Regolatori), that gained access to the accounting 
information of the Gabella, the Biccherna and all camarlenghi of the Comune. Also, the Riveditori were 
initially tied to the Biccherna through well-defined dependency relationships, but they soon attained 
autonomy. This autonomy was reinforced when the Regolatori came into being.  
New auditing practices gradually embedded and formalized the loss of the Biccherna’s supervisory 
role over the accounts of the Gabella, as well as over the Riveditori, thereby weakening the Biccherna’s 
political and administrative power and stimulating new power relationships. The role of the Riveditori 
(and later the Regulatori) was reinforced as they got access to the accounts of all those who were in 
charge of the management of public resources, including the Biccherna and the Gabella. By reviewing 
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their accounting books, it was possible to check and verify not only cases of possible fraud against the 
Comune, but also to control the way in which financial resources were being used (figure 1. - arrows 
“e”). For instance, by overseeing the accounts, the Regolatori could verify the way in which the 
Gabella was utilizing incoming public funds, whether or not the funds were being duly turned over 
to the Biccherna and how the Biccherna was making payments (figure 1. - arrows “f”). On the other 
hand, the Gabella and the Biccherna could rely upon accounting records to legitimise their activities 
and interactions (figure 1. - arrow “g”). 
The evolving social relationships and auditing practices described above demonstrate the dialectic 
between auditing practices and their social construction process. On the one hand, the emergence of 
new auditing practices can be regarded as the outcome of a social process, within which auditing 
techniques were not pre-set means for order but were themselves created throughout the evolving 
search for control from the governing bodies of the medieval City State. On the other hand, auditing 
practices stimulated new social relationships and systems (i.e., the evolving relationships between the 
financial offices), shaping reciprocal rights and obligations, legitimising their autonomy or 
dependency. 
While leaving enough flexibility for evolving social relationships to emerge, auditing practices re-
embedded, and thereby reinforced and formalized, these relationships within an unfolding dialectic 
between social processes (i.e. the search for order and control and the following changes in power 
relationships, allowed by the “interpretative flexibility” of the practice) and the subsequent 
“stabilizing of the practice” (i.e. the re-embedding of emerging social relationships within the official 
auditing system). 
The auditing of the accounts of the transactions between the Gabella and the Biccherna allowed not 
only for monitoring their activities and for controlling them at a distance, but also for legitimising 
their relations, making it possible to demonstrate respective rights and obligations, as stated in the 
municipal provisions. The emerging social relationships were re-embedded into new auditing 
practices, which contributed to communicating and transmitting the priorities of the City State in an 
historical period characterised by a growing need for control over the management of financial 
resources (figure 1. - arrows “a” and “e”), above all in the change from the government of Nine to 
that of Twelve. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
This paper has explored emerging auditing practices in the Comune of Siena in the 14th century. In 
particular, we have analysed the changing social relations among the various bodies of the 
administrative apparatus of the Comune and the following emergence of auditing and control 
practices. 
This paper provides several contributions. Firstly, we add to the auditing literature by shedding light 
on the social and organising dimension of auditing practices. In the case of the Comune, the command 
over the auditing process represented a significant source of power. On the one hand, auditing 
practices emerged from (and embodied) the social system of power and authority around the offices 
in charge of the collection of taxes and payments on behalf of the Comune. On the other hand, 
auditing practices demonstrated enough flexibility to leave space to (and stimulate) new social 
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relationships. In particular, auditing practices played an important function in regulating and 
legitimising the changing interactions between the Biccherna and the Gabella. These practices both 
shaped and were themselves the outcome of a social construction process within which social relations 
between the different bodies were continuously evolving. 
Secondly, we contribute to the literature in accounting history and in archival sources by shedding 
light on the origin of accounting as an ‘object of control’ in the medieval age. In so doing, we also 
demonstrate how an historical perspective can be used to speculate on the social dimension and 
implications of auditing practices, and on the role played by auditing as both a means and an outcome 
of the social search for order. This is an unexplored area in both the accounting history and auditing 
literature. 
The present study relies on a case from the Middle Ages and on archival material from the 14th century, 
but it offers insights for exploring the social implications of auditing practices also in contemporary 
settings. We show here how a “sociology of audit knowledge perspective” (Power 1995) can be 
applied to an historical case to shed light on the social construction of auditing beyond its mere 
technical and apparently rational features. 
 
Figure 1. Power relations and auditing systems in the 14th century 
General Council of the Comune 
(under the Government  
of the Nine) 
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